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By JEFF GOLDSMITH
In late June, 2024, two economists, Zarek Brot-Goldberg and Zack Cooper, from the College of Chicago and Yale respectively, launched an financial analysis arguing that hospital mergers harm native economies and end in a rise in deaths by suicide and drug overdoses within the markets the place mergers happen. Funded by Arnold Ventures their examine characterizes these mergers as “lease searching for actions” by hospitals searching for to make use of their financial energy to extort monetary features from their communities with out offering any worth.
The Brot-Goldberg-Cooper evaluation was a spin-off of a bigger study decrying the dearth of federal anti-trust enforcement relating to hospital mergers. These two research used the identical financial mannequin. The info had been derived from the Healthcare Cost Institute, a repository of business insurance coverage claims data from three of the 4 largest business well being insurers, United Healthcare, Humana and Aetna (a subsidiary of struggling pharmacy big CVS) plus Blue Cross/Blue Defend. HCCI’s contributors account for 28% of the business medical health insurance market.
The authors use a posh econometric mannequin to control an enormous, multifactorial information base comprising hospital merger exercise, employer well being advantages information, county degree employment information and morbidity and mortality statistics. This information mannequin enabled a raft of regression analyses making an attempt to ferret out “associations” between the assorted domains of those information.
Utilizing HCCI’s information, the authors assemble what they termed a “causal chain” main from hospital mergers to group harm throughout their examine interval–2010 to 2015. It regarded like this: hospital mergers increase costs for personal insurers-these costs are handed on to employers–who reply by shedding staff–a few of whom find yourself killing themselves. So, in response to the logic, hospital mergers kill folks. Utilizing the identical methodology, the authors argued that between 2007 and 2014, hospital value will increase of all kinds killed ten thousand folks.
A traditional drawback with correlational research of this type is their failure to make clear the course of causality of information components. The mannequin lacked a management group–comparable communities that didn’t expertise hospital mergers throughout this era–as a result of the authors argued that mergers had been so pervasive they might not find comparable communities that didn’t expertise them.
The mannequin centered on a subset of 304 hospital mergers from 2010 to 2015, culled from a universe of 484 mergers nationally throughout the identical interval. The authors excluded mergers of hospitals that had been additional than fifty miles aside, in addition to hospitals with low census. The impact of those assumptions was to exclude most rural hospitals and focus the mergers studied in metropolitan areas and cities. The densest cluster was within the I-95 hall between Washington DC and Boston. See the map beneath:

In accordance with the mannequin, these mergers resulted in a median enhance of 1.2% in hospital costs to business insurers, 91% of which had been handed to their employer clients in these markets. This minuscule fee enhance had a curiously centered and outsized impact–a $10,584 enhance within the median employer’s well being spending within the merged hospitals’ market.
In accordance with the mannequin, native employers “responded” to this value enhance by lowering their payrolls by a median quantity of $17,900, all by layoffs–70% greater than the alleged merger value enhance. This massive overage was not defined by the authors. Furthermore, the layoffs befell nearly instantly, in the identical yr because the merger-induced will increase, although many medical health insurance contracts are multi-year affairs, and lock hospitals in to charges for that interval.
On the finish of the “causal chain,” 1 in 140 laid off folks in these communities for no matter cause killed themselves by suicide or drug overdoses. By extrapolation, the authors accuse the perpetrators of total hospital fee will increase of killing ten thousand folks within the affected communities throughout seven years overlapping the examine interval.
Failing the Take a look at of Actual World Plausibility
It’s troublesome to know the place to start to unravel this advanced internet of “associations”. The most important puzzle is the magnification of influence of a 1.2% “shock”, because the authors time period it, to well being advantages value on employers. To place this in in perspective, the 1.2% common value enhance is in opposition to a well being profit that quantities to about 9%, on common, of the pattern employers’ whole compensation prices.* So, 1.2% enhance of a 9% value is an precisely one tenth of 1% (.001) enhance in employer’s whole compensation expense. Payroll and advantages are in flip maybe 50-70% of an employer’s whole working expense. A one-tenth of a p.c enhance in employment prices is a mosquito chew, not a “shock”.
The authors’ inferred leap from this micro-increase in employer prices to widespread layoffs is indefensible in comparison with actual world managerial habits. The authors dominated out the obvious value response–cost-shifting to staff by elevating their deductibles or copayments–on the grounds that they discovered no adjustments in Well being Financial savings Account enrollment within the pattern through the 5 yr examine interval. After greater than quadrupling from 2006 to 2011, development in HSA enrollment levelled off over the past 4 years of the examine interval.
But employer value shifting to staff by elevating their out-of-pocket spending limits accelerated throughout the identical interval. In accordance with Kaiser/HRET’s annual survey, from 2010 to 2015, the variety of staff with deductibles and co-insurance greater than $2,000 doubled. Thus, the results of any business medical health insurance fee will increase, no matter their measurement, had been probably shared broadly throughout the whole lined inhabitants within the merger-affected markets.
Most employers dealing with financial challenges bend over backwards to keep away from parting firm with productive, skilled staff. And so they have a variety of choices to keep away from doing so: elevating costs, chopping hourly staff’ hours, shifting staff from workers to contractors (dodging advantages bills altogether), pressuring different suppliers for reductions, enhancing productiveness, discovering new clients, and “shrinkflation” of their product (e.g. a half-ounce smaller Almond Pleasure bar for a similar value ). None of those responses had been measured or managed for within the mannequin.
Meager Train of Market Energy
If an anti-competitive train of market energy was the objective of the mergers, then a median 1.2% fee enhance struck us as a remarkably meager train of that energy. If merging hospitals had been free to cost what they needed as a result of that they had elevated bargaining energy, why not cost 10% or 20% extra after merging? In accordance with colleagues who work in hospital mergers and acquisitions, transaction prices in a merger can run 3-5% of an acquired hospitals’ annual revenues, and the advanced transaction itself is a big problem.
A 1.2% post-merger fee enhance wouldn’t even cowl the transaction prices of the merger (authorized, accounting and actuarial evaluation, deal brokers and funding banker charges, programs integration consultants to get their totally different “cases” of EPIC to speak and out of doors specialists to help in operational enhancements, and many others), not to mention yield any precise money circulation to the merged entity.
What Precipitated the Deaths?
As for the ultimate leap -that one in 140 of the employees presumably laid off by these employer reductions in power kills themselves or overdose on medicine–authors made no traceable efforts to tie these deaths to the businesses allegedly shedding staff. Right here, specifically, the absence of management teams makes it inconceivable to find out how a lot contribution, if any, hospital fee will increase or mergers made to the general upward pattern of deaths of despair within the affected communities, versus different comparable communities.
The authors didn’t management for the opposite components that result in deaths of despair within the goal communities and which may introduce “covariance” error–divorces, deaths of family members, broad-based declines in employment alternatives, closures of church buildings, faculties, or group based mostly providers, declining availability of psychological well being providers or the sudden arrival of lethal fentanyl within the native market.
Keep in mind the authors intentionally oversampled city markets. Lots of the city counties lined within the examine (Cook dinner County-Chicago, Nassau County-Queens, Wayne County-Detroit, Philadelphia County e.gs) are each huge and rife with city poverty. To tie deaths of despair in these troubled communities to hospital mergers is an egregious case of victim-blaming. The identical forces that result in deaths of despair–the lack of financial alternative and social assist–are those harming their hospitals and resulting in their mergers or closure.
What Precipitated the Mergers within the First Place?
I’m an skilled in hospital technique. In 1980, I wrote a e book known as Can Hospitals Survive, which predicted a lot of the following consolidation within the trade. In my forty yr consulting profession, I labored for greater than a dozen struggling hospitals that needed to retain their independence. In my lengthy trade expertise, hospital boards and medical staffs don’t willingly give up their autonomy and historic identification except compelled to by financial circumstances.
The fact is most hospital mergers aren’t actually mergers in any respect, they’re acquisitions of a poorly performing unbiased hospital or system by a bigger hospital or well being system. No much less an authority on hospital financing than MedPac Chair Michael Chernew discovered that higher levels of Medicare funding as a proportion of whole predispose hospitals to failure and, subsequently, merger. An extreme focus of Medicaid and uninsured sufferers has an much more opposed influence. Value shifting to employers, and charging these employers extra is the one approach economically challenged hospitals can get better their losses. The authors didn’t measure or assess the function that opposed payor-mix adjustments performed in hospital fee will increase, or analyze its function in inflicting hospitals to merge. They tried, unsuccessfully for my part, to regulate for failing native economies as a explanation for mergers, employer layoffs and deaths of despair by excluding low census hospitals from their merger evaluation in addition to excluding most rural hospital mergers. However many hospitals which can be failing are full of publicly funded sufferers whose protection pays 85% or much less of their precise prices, or of sufferers with no insurance coverage in any respect.
Merger or Closure: The Actual Selection Dealing with Communities
Most significantly in my opinion, the authors made no effort to match the results of a merger to that of the lack of the hospital itself. Hospitals are sometimes the group’s largest employer. The authors estimate that merger-induced fee will increase increase the unemployment fee within the native market across the merged hospital by maybe a tenth of a proportion level.
In contrast, hospital closure in a rural group can raise the unemployment rate by 1.6 percentage points–that may be a sixteen-fold higher impact. Measuring the unemployment impact in small or giant metropolitan labor markets is tougher however the results of hospital closure can run into the numerous a whole bunch of jobs misplaced, not counting the “multiplier” results on suppliers, trade companions and neighboring companies.
Whether or not saving these hospitals was definitely worth the value paid by a post-merger fee enhance is the real-world coverage query. Although this proposition wants empirical testing, I imagine that the majority communities would willingly commerce a 1.2% medical health insurance fee enhance for avoiding the lack of their hospital. Excluding the low census hospitals from their regression runs was the authors’ failed try to keep away from discussing this tradeoff.
Whatever the situation of the mergee, the authors made a whopping worth judgment in assuming that that the 1.2% common post-merger fee enhance was merely extortion, borne of elevated market leverage, not the worth paid for persevering with that hospital’s operations locally. The authors additionally made no effort to measure post-merger service enhancements, comparable to elevated doctor retention or recruitment, administration or capital enhancements or different tangible advantages.
Although some research the authors cite fail to search out value discount or high quality advantages accruing from hospital mergers, newer analyses (for roughly the identical examine interval as Cooper’s) discovered convincing proof {that a} stronger working accomplice leads to a statistically vital drop in prices (-2.5%) per adjusted admission at acquired hospitals, which is in step with the hospitals gaining economies of scale post-merger. There was additionally statistically vital decline (-3.9%) in income per adjusted admission, which casts doubt upon the ‘mergers result in increased costs’ speculation.
Adequacy of Hospital Capability a Urgent Concern
Throughout the 1970’s, federal health policy in United States centered on controlling the provision of hospitals and hospital beds within the US, believing that efforts to fill empty beds had been a serious driver of well being value development, then in double digits. On the time of Can Hospitals Survive, 30% of hospitals had been already a part of programs. Since that point, almost a thousand hospitals have closed, and the proportion of hospitals which can be a part of multi-hospital programs has grown to 70% or higher. Hospital inpatient utilization measured by hospital days per thousand has fallen by half since 1980.
In comparison with the Well being Planning statute’s goal of 4 acute care beds per thousand, right this moment the US is at 2.3 beds per thousand. The US now has the twenty sixth lowest ratio of hospital beds to inhabitants of the 28 OECD international locations. Throughout the pandemic, many communities skilled critical shortages of hospital ICU beds, ER capability, and many others. and had been housing sufferers requiring intensive medical providers in tents within the car parking zone.
Confronted with a selection between merging struggling hospitals into bigger programs and dropping these hospitals–each their service capability and their employment–by hospital closure, the US doesn’t have a margin of error. If the surviving multi-hospital well being programs can’t show measurable advantages not solely to acquired hospitals but in addition for the communities they serve, there are going to be severe repercussions for the way forward for Medicare and for the nation’s well being.
This leap from a one-tenth of 1 p.c enhance in employment prices to widespread layoffs and deaths within the affected markets calls into query not solely authors’ methodology but in addition their objectivity. Essentially the most charitable rationalization for this odd concentrate on layoffs is what behavioral economists name “confirmation bias,” the unconscious tendency all of us should ignore information or relationships that don’t affirm pre-existing expectations.
Investigators succumbing to affirmation bias have a tendency to search out what they got down to discover.
A much less charitable rationalization is that the authors discovered what their funders (e.g. Arnold Ventures) anticipated them to search out, given the investigators’ past research findings and the funder’s desired coverage conclusion, that anti-competitive conduct damages native economies and must be reined in.
In both case, a rigorous seek for precise causes is circumvented, and readers are misled.
Nobel Laureate economics Ronald Coase as soon as mentioned: “When you torture information lengthy sufficient, it’s going to confess to something.” That maxim appeared totally related to the evaluation of merger impacts we’ve got been discussing. For my part as a very long time participant/observer of the hospital consolidation course of, the authors made no contribution no matter to fixing the issue of easy methods to guarantee entry by struggling communities to hospital providers, nor making these providers extra inexpensive to these communities’ residents. Truly working in these communities is a helpful antidote in opposition to being hypnotized by econometric fashions. Blaming hospital mergers for damaging their communities’ economies and killing its residents shouldn’t be solely a gratuitous insult to the concerned hospitals and their boards, it additionally strikes us no nearer to a sustainable well being system going ahead.
The analysis underpinning this paper was funded by the Federation of American Hospitals, however the opinions expressed therein are the creator’s alone. Trevor Goldsmith assisted with analysis on this paper, and Richard Bajner and Keith Pitts supplied insights into the economics of hospital merger transactions.
Jeff Goldsmith is a veteran well being care futurist, President of Well being Futures Inc and common THCB Contributor. This comes from his personal substack
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